Occupational licensing is among the fastest-growing labor market institutions in the U.S. economy. One of the key features of occupational licensing is that the law determines who gets to do the work. In those cases where universally licensed occupations are both complements to and substitutes for one another in providing a service, the government determines who can do the tasks that are required for the consumer. In this study, we examine dentists and dental hygienists, who are both universally licensed and provide complementary services to patients, but may also be substitutes as service providers. We focus on the labor market implications of governmental requirements on permissible tasks and the supervision of hygienists' activities by dentists. Since there are elements of monopsony in the market we examine, we use the model as a guide for our analysis. We find that states that allow hygienists to be self-employed have about 10 percent higher earnings, and that dentists in those states have lower earnings and slower employment growth. Several sensitivity and falsification tests using other regulated and partially regulated occupations show that our licensing measures are generally robust to alternative specifications. Our estimates are consistent with the view that winning the policy and legal battle in the legislature and courts on the independence of work rules matters in the labor market for these occupations.
Introduction
In this paper we examine two occupations-dentists and dental hygienists-that are both universally licensed and provide complementary services to patients, but which are also substitutes for certain tasks as service providers. However, for key services the states determine who can do the work, the market structure, and what is required for the patient. We examine the labor market implications of these governmental requirements. With the growth in the number of individuals who are regulated or seeking regulation by the states, our case study can illuminate the potential economic issues of the increased regulation of occupations in the U.S. labor market, especially where the work of the regulated occupations overlaps. It also gives an illustration of the kinds of issues that arise as more occupations become regulated and turf battles arise over who is legally allowed to do work for pay.
In order to examine these relationships between dentists and hygienists, we initially explore the evolution of state regulation for both occupations over time, and what battle lines have evolved for both occupations. We then show the anatomy of state regulations for dental hygienists over time. We next further develop a model that includes the basic production function in dentistry, with dentists as a scale factor and hygienists as key elements. We show how a monopsony relationship, where there are frictions in the market and employers have the ability to collude to set wages, between dentists and hygienists influences the earnings and employment of hygienists and dentists. The empirical section shows the influence of state regulations on hygienists' earnings, and how the ability of hygienists to be self-employed is associated with an earnings increase of approximately 10 percent. Further, when hygienists are able to work without the supervision of a dentist, there is an associated increase in the state-level employment growth of hygienists, but lower employment growth and earnings for dentists.
These results are robust to sensitivity tests for similar partially licensed occupations and other health-related occupations that are regulated. To the extent that these estimates suggest inefficiencies due to licensing and monopsonistic deadweight loss, we provide results of these estimated losses. The rest of the analysis presents how we developed these findings.
Evolution and Anatomy of the Regulation of Dentists and Dental Hygienists
In this part of our study, we present the evolution and anatomy of state licensing of dentists and hygienists, and show how state policies have changed to favor greater autonomy for hygienists (Adams, 2004) .
State licensing of dentists first began in South Carolina in 1876; Pennsylvania followed suit the next year. The last state to fully license dentists was North Carolina in 1935. Currently, most members of licensing boards are appointed by the governor through a list provided by the state dental association. Generally, dentists dominate the state licensing boards; other licensed professionals such as hygienists have a minority role in the process. Typically, state licensing boards either have no hygienists or, more likely, have dentists that dominate the boards; however, 17 states have separate hygienists' committees that provide recommendations to the board and, in some cases, to the legislature (Wanchek, 2010) . As recently as 1994, 9 states forbid the employment of more than two hygienists in a dental office fixing the scale effect for these two occupations (ADHA, 1994) . The licensing board deals with disciplinary issues involving dentists. However, the portion that deals with the allocation of work among various service providers and that gives services to clients is of direct interest for our analysis. For example, the board makes recommendations to the legislature on regulations governing which occupation provides dental services, and provides legal services to defend regulatory practices in state courts.
The state licensing of dental hygienists began with the regulation of hygienists by New York in 1868. Over 50 years passed before other state governments followed suit: 5 additional states licensed this occupation between 1919 and 1921 (Council of State Governments, 1952 .
By 1952, 29 states had full licensing of dental hygienists, and in recent years, all the other states have come to license dental hygienists (Council of State Governments, 1952) . Dental hygiene is unique among licensed professions in that it is regulated by dentists, rather than self-regulated, in most states (Wanchek, 2010) . 1 Initially, dental hygiene programs were one year long but have since been expanded; programs now take between two and four years to complete. A particularly illustrative example of regulatory oversight by the occupation occurred when military dental hygienists who returned to the civilian workforce requested to sit for the hygienist's exam. The civilian hygienists protested, saying that the military hygienists needed the same years of dental hygiene training as the civilian hygienists in order to take the licensing exam. One of the key issues for the licensing boards of dental services was the work that dentists could do relative to hygienists and the supervision of dental hygienists by dentists (Helm, 1993) . Traditionally, dentists are required to be physically present when hygienists are doing their work. As early as 1932, the issue of determining the proper tasks of hygienists relative to dentists was raised at national meetings of hygienists, with a view that hygienists should have greater autonomy. A key part of the history of the profession focused on the importance of hygienists playing a more important role in the policy process, particularly with respect to legislative issues. Until 1988, when Colorado first allowed hygienists to practice without the direct supervision of a dentist, hygienists have been 1 Exceptions are in Washington, where dental hygienists are regulated by the director of the state health department in consultation with a committee of three dental hygienists and a consumer. In Connecticut, dental hygienists are regulated directly by the health department. In New Mexico, hygienists are regulated by a committee of five dental hygienists, one dentist, and a consumer. In all the other states, dentists dominate the decision process of who gets to do the work. required to work for or be under the direction of a dentist. Since that time, seven states have allowed hygienists to be self-employed without the direct oversight of a dentist.
2
As of 2007, no state permitted reciprocity of the movement of dental hygienists from other states.
In the late 1970s, the American Dental Hygienists' Association (ADHA) supported alternative practice methods that would allow the dental hygienist to become the primary provider of initial services in accordance with state dental and dental hygiene practice acts (Motley, 1988) . In response to these policy changes, the American Dental Association (ADA) passed a resolution stating that dental hygienists are auxiliaries who must work under the supervision of a dentist, who also retained ownership and managerial authority (Beach, Shulman, Johns, and Paas, 2007) . Over time, hygienists have been able to gain greater authority in state legislatures as their numbers have increased in overall dental practice, and consequently their influence in crafting licensing laws has grown. These policy provisions by both dental service organizations set the battlegrounds for conflicts in state legislatures, licensing boards, and the courts.
State-Level Anatomy of Dental Hygienists' Legally Permitted Job Characteristics
In order to show the growth in hygienists' autonomy over time, in Figure 1 we develop and show a box-and-whisker graphic analysis of state regulation, which gives the mean and spread of the regulation of hygienists over the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . Panel A shows the overall ranking of dental hygienists' professional practice environment that is allowed by statute or legal rulings. Panel B shows the number of dental tasks that hygienists are permitted to do, 2 As of 2007, seven states (California, Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oregon, and Washington) allow hygienists to be self-employed other than as independent contractors, and only three states (California, Colorado, and New Mexico) permit a dental hygienist to own a dental hygiene practice (Beach et. al., 2007) . Montana and Nebraska adopted the provision to allow hygienists to be self-employed other than as independent contractors in 2003 and 2007, respectively. The work by dental hygienists who are self-employed is restricted to specific kinds of dental practices that vary across these states. For example, in Colorado hygienists are allowed to clean teeth and do simple restorative work, independently of a dentist. generally greater control of the regulatory process by dentists, hygienists have been able to gain more autonomy over the delivery of dental services to include the ability to control their own offices without the supervision of a dentist. Moreover, even within states that have full control over the delivery of dental services, there has been growth in the independence of hygienists from monitoring by dentists with respect to specific dental procedures, and likely an increase in the skills and education provided to clients of dental services.
In the next section, we model the role for dentists and hygienists in the production function of dental services and how the market for hygienists' services may resemble a monopsony in certain elements of the market for dentists and hygienists.
A Model of Dental Services Production
This section initially develops the basic production function for dental services and then expands it to include government regulation of work practices, where dentists are required to supervise hygienists. The model serves as a basis to inform the empirical work, rather than as a fully specified general equilibrium model of dental production under regulation. The unit of analysis for the model is the office-based dental practice. Following Reinhardt (1972) , this entity can be treated as a firm of which the dentist is the owner/manager who faces a profit maximization decision. The dentist makes decisions regarding her own effort to maximize income, subject to constraints including the technical production relationship between her labor and other inputs:
(1)
Q d is the output produced by the dentists, which we will refer to as "high-skilled dental services (HH)." Q h is the output produced by the hygienists, which we will refer to as "lowskilled dental services (HL)." D(z) represents the dentist's labor, recognizing that output relies on his decision of personal input, and H(z) represents the hygienist's labor, recognizing that output relies on her decision of personal input. K represents the quantities of capital inputs used in a dental practice. For simplicity we consider capital (office space and equipment) and dental employees, who are of two types of labor: dentists and hygienists. 4 When analyzing occupations that are licensed, we follow Shapiro (1986) , who models a labor market where service output has two types of workers: high-skilled and lower-skilled. In order to adapt the model to our production function and the market for dentists and hygienists, we have created a stylized version of production and output. The specifics of the model are presented next.
An explanation of the theory with licensing can be written as follows for dentists:
,
where HH is the high-skilled dental services provided, and A is the technology provided to produce HH, L is the labor input, and K is capital.
Similarly, the output for hygienists can be given by the following expression: ,
where HL is the low-skilled dental services provided, and B is the technology provided to produce HL.
However, by law the technology needed to produce HL for the hygienists is tied to supervision by the dentist. This expression can be written as follows:
.
Therefore, the production function for hygienists can be written as follows:
where in the case of L d = 0 with regulation, there is no production of dental hygienists' services.
We also assume that L d + L h = 1. Therefore, 1 and 1.
The profit function for dental services can be written as
where ρ = 1 is the case of no regulation and 0 1, and P is the price of the service.
Equation (7) is a profit function for the hygienist if the price of the service is normalized as 1. Equation (8) is a profit function for the dentist, where w h L h is the cost of labor and r h K h is the cost of capital. Within this profit function, the hygienist's wage is determined by the decisions of the dentist to use of the hygienist's labor input and technology mix by the highskilled provider, HH, and is exogenous. As the hygienist's wage goes down, the dentist's wage will go up. Also implied is that the hygienist's employment will go up and the dentist's employment will go down. These conditions, which are a modified production function, can therefore lead to conditions that are consistent with a monopsony market for hygienists. Under occupational licensing, both dentists and hygienists are often assumed to attempt to capture the rents of licensing and reallocate resources from the consumer to the regulated practitioners (Friedman, 1962) . The application to our case study assumes that the relatively lowskilled (hygienist) workers, HL, can by law do only low-skilled work and are allowed to work only under the supervision of relatively high-skilled workers, HH. With favorable regulation for dentists, the high-skilled workers that control low-skilled workers' tasks and their ability to do work only for certain types of employers have monopsonistic characteristics to employ lowerskilled workers and capture rents. When regulation of employment by high-skilled workers of low-skilled workers ceases, low-skilled workers can open their own establishments and capture the licensing rents for themselves (Groshen, 1991) . For monopsony to exist, there are generally two key assumptions in the labor market (Manning, 2003) . First, important frictions are assumed to be present. In the case of two universally licensed occupations, with one dominant, this requires the supervision of the other, and the assumption of frictions in the labor market is established. Second, employers have some ability to set wages. Since dental hygienists have no other major options for employment other than working for or under the supervision of a dentist, they can have significant market power to collude to set wages in a local market. This is consistent with one of the elements of monopsony (Lipscomb and Douglas, 1982) .
It implies that the hygienist's wage will go down and the dentist's wage will go up. Also, it implies that the employment of hygienists will go down and dentists' employment will go up (Varian, 1992) .
A simple static partial equilibrium model of monopsony in the context of occupational licensing is shown in Figure 2 , where a monopsonist employer maximizes profits with employment L, which equates demand, given by the marginal revenue product (MRP) curve, to marginal cost MC at point A. With licensing, both occupations are able to restrict the supply of labor and raise wages within each occupation. Although we do not estimate a structural model of an equilibrium model of monopsony, the model informs our empirical work in the next section of our study.
We further assume that the occupation (i.e., dentists who employ hygienists) is a simple monopsonist who has to pay a single wage to all its workers. The occupation also has a revenue function. In the model, the occupation is assumed to face a labor supply curve that relates the wage paid w to the level of employment, L. Denote the supply of labor to the occupation if it pays w by L(w), and w(L) will be referred to as the labor supply curve to the individual occupation. Both L(w) and w(L) will be referred to as the labor supply curve to the occupation.
Total labor costs are given by w(L)L. Assume that the occupation, dentistry, is a simple monopsonist who has to pay a single wage to all the workers under its control. Assume the occupation has a revenue function Y(L). It wants to choose L to maximize profits, which are given by .
The first-order condition is
The value is the marginal revenue product of labor, and is the marginal cost of labor. The latter increases total labor costs when an additional worker is hired (Manning, 2003) . Although in our case dentists are making positive profits on the marginal hygienists, there is no incentive to increase employment because doing so would require increasing the wage to attract the extra worker, and this higher wage must be paid to all existing workers. The gap between the wage and the marginal revenue product in Figure 2 is referred to as the rate of exploitation (Manning, 2003) . In our case, the model predicts that laws that require hygienists to work for or be supervised by dentists would result in lower wages and employment for hygienists. In addition, if the laws were relaxed, there would likely be lower earnings and employment for dentists, since the level of exploitation would be reduced. Further, the lower employment and wage caused by monopsony power has two distinct effects on the economic welfare of the occupations. First, the law, when it favors dentists' control over the market structure, redistributes welfare away from workers (hygienists) and to their employer (dentists).
Second, the market structure established by these two occupations reduces the aggregate (or social) welfare enjoyed by both groups taken together, since the employers' net gain is smaller than the loss inflicted on workers. It is a net social loss or deadweight loss. It is a measure of the market failure caused by monopsony power, through a misallocation of resources. MM' is the part that the monopsonist licensed employer has exploited from the other licensed workers. Triangle LL"C is deadweight loss, the part of the competitive social surplus that has been lost by society due to the licensing of workers.
The estimates of the empirical influence of monopsony without licensing have been mixed. For example, the results for specific industries range from major league baseball, where the impact has been large (100 to 600 percent), to teachers, nurses, and nurses assistants where the influence has been 5 percent or less (Scully, 1974; Zimbalist, 1992, Kahn; 2000; Matsudaira, 2010) . For the overall labor market, the impact of monopsony has been estimated at less than 3 percent (Brown and Medoff, 1989) . Our analysis is the first attempt to estimate monopsony for both workers and their primary occupational employer as a result of variations in occupational licensing statutes, specifically related to the ability of hygienists to open their own dental practice offices or do work independently of dentists (Boal and Ransom, 1997) .
Measurement of Dental Hygiene Professional Practice Index (DHPPI)
To assess state government regulations on the professional practice environment of dental 1. Legal and regulatory environment. Governance of the profession through the state regulatory board of dental hygiene or a dental hygiene committee empowered by a dental board with a mandate to regulate the profession, licensure by credential/endorsement with no new clinical exam required, scope of practice defined in law or regulations, and restriction to patient of record of primary employing dentist.
2. Supervision in different practice settings. Dental supervision requirements across a variety of health settings including private dental offices, long-term care facilities, schools, public health agencies, correctional facilities, and similar institutional facilities.
The supervision requirements vary from direct supervision to general and collaborator supervision, and to complete autonomy.
3. Tasks permitted under varying levels of supervision. Tasks allowed for dental hygienists to provide basic services such as prophylaxis, sealants, fluorides, X-rays, hygiene screening and assessment, as well as expanded functions such as placing amalgam restorations, administration of local anesthesia, and administration of nitrous oxide.
to wage determination and employment outcomes than other components, we also examine each individual component in two ways. In particular, we focus on two major components: tasks permitted and supervision requirements. Because the weights to the sub-items of these components of the DHPPI are assigned in somewhat arbitrary fashion, we develop both the summated rating scale (the summated rating scale) and the statistically weighted index (Rasch index) for each component. Therefore, we examine how each state's regulatory system on the professional practice environments affects the market outcomes of the professions by using both linear (summated rating scale) and nonlinear (Rasch index) measures of the regulatory system.
Finally, we analyze whether the provision that permits hygienists to be self-employed other than as independent contractors affects the market outcomes. The table in Appendix A presents the operational definition of our regulatory variables. hygienists from the ACS. The values show that the average age of dentists is about six years higher than that for hygienists, and that dentists have six more years of schooling. Further, the dentistry profession tends to be male dominated, whereas 97 percent of hygienists are female.
The average hourly earnings of dentists are more than three times as high as for hygienists. One important distinction from the data is that although 71 percent of dentists are self-employed, only 2 percent of hygienists work for themselves. Part of this difference may be due to state laws that require dentists to directly supervise the work of hygienists.
Our estimates in Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate the association between DHPPI and hourly earnings for dental hygienists and dentists, using individual-level data in the ACS. The basic general earnings equation can be stated as follows:
where Earnings it is the hourly earnings of dentist (D) In Table 3 we show the impact of the overall DHPPI index on the logarithm of hourly earnings of hygienists with all the controls for individual characteristics shown in Table 2 that were extracted from the ACS. Our results show that the DHPPI level is not a significant factor in determining hourly earnings. However, the legal ability either to be self-employed or to have tasks unsupervised is a key factor influencing wage determination. For example, having the ability to be self-employed raises hygienists' hourly earnings by approximately a statistically significant 10 percent, and working unsupervised measured by the summated score (the Rasch score) is associated with an 1.2 or 0.7 percent increase in earnings for hygienists.
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In contrast for dentists in Table 4 , the estimates from the model using the same set of controls from the ACS as in Table 3 indicate that having state provisions that allow for hygienists to be self-employed is associated with approximately 16 percent lower hourly earnings for the dentists than for those members of the occupation who are generally required by law to supervise dental hygienists.
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It appears that dentists lose more perhaps because they are no longer able to require hygienists to only work for them in order to provide dental services.
The consequence of the legal provision may result in higher costs due to higher wages for hygienists. In addition, there may be lost income because hygienists may be taking patients away 9 Although an alternative specification might be a difference-in-difference approach, we do not have the same individuals over time by state. However, our ability to control for time and state fixed effects suggests that our policy variables influence wages for each occupation beyond state or time varying characteristics. 10 We also examined whether hygienists are directly reimbursed under the state government regulations with the same specifications. Although not shown in this paper, the direct reimbursement is associated with approximately 5.1 percent higher earnings for hygienists and 8.4 percent lower earnings for dentists, but is statistically significant at the 0.01 level only for hygienists. However, the direct reimbursement is not statistically significant in the employment growth models in Tables 5 and 6 . 11 We further examined the impact of state government regulations on the hourly earnings gap between dentists and hygienists. To do this, we computed the state median hourly earnings of each profession. Consistent with the results in Tables 3 and 4 , Appendix C shows that state regulations reduced the hourly earnings gap between these professions.
from full-service dentists and recommending fewer costly dental procedures.
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To illustrate, there are powerful incentive effects for dentists to recommend more costly procedures. On average, sealants cost $37, but most fillings cost more than $100 and also need to be replaced periodically (Simonsen, 1991) . Once fillings are installed, there is a greater likelihood of both crowns and root canals, both of which cost more than $1,000 each. Since hygienists can only work on sealants, having independent hygienists can have a major impact on dental incomes by changing the service and product mix. Sealants provide protection from further tooth decay that is as good as or better than the protection from fillings (Gooch, 2009) . Further, the signs of the coefficients for the ability of hygienists to engage in broader work assignments are negative in the remainder of the specifications for dentists' wage determination.
We also examined whether state provisions that allow for hygienists to be self-employed are associated with earnings dispersions for the two occupations.
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The results in Table 5 show that the dispersion of the log of hourly earnings for hygienists in the states with the selfemployment provisions was 15 percent higher than in the states without the provisions, and was statistically significant at the 0.05 level. But no statistically significant difference was found for dentists.
The employment effects of variations in state statutes for dental hygienists and dentists are given in Tables 6 and 7, respectively. 14 The general employment equation can be stated as follows:
12 For example, independent dental hygienists are likely to recommend lower-cost dental sealants, but a hygienist who works in a full-service office may have incentives to recommend a higher-cost dental filling due to bonuses or promotion opportunities. 13 We computed the dispersions using a similar estimation procedure as in Kleiner and Krueger, 2010}Our firststage estimates of the residual values for dental hygienists and dentists were from column 6 in Tables 3 and 4 , respectively. We then computed the mean squared residual s for each occupation by whether self-employment was allowed. We compared the significance of the values generated in each category using the t-value.
14 As a further test of the reliability of our employment data, we correlated the data from Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) with membership data from the ADHA by state for 2002-2006 and the number of active dentists in
where Employment st is the employment growth of dentists (D) and hygienists (H) at state s in time period t; R st is the DHPPI and its components at state s in time period t; the vector X st includes covariates measuring economic and dental characteristics within each state; δ s and η t are state and year fixed effects, respectively; and u st is the error term.
The estimates from our reduced form model in Table 6 show that the overall index is not significantly associated with employment growth of hygienists in equations that include statelevel controls such as the growth in the number of dentists in the state, the state median household income, the percentage of uninsured in the state, and the state median prices of amalgam restoration and prophylaxis in each specification in the table. However, whether hygienists can be self-employed is positively and statistically significant at the 0.10 level in its association with employment growth of hygienists by about 6 percent. Further, enhancing the ability of hygienists to do various tasks without the supervision of dentists also is associated with positive employment growth for their occupation. This outcome is consistent with our production model of dental services, and with the monopsony model of dentists and hygienists in the determination of wages and employment. Table 7 shows the relationship between the statutes and the growth of employment for dentists in the state. We find that giving greater autonomy to hygienists is associated with a significantly negative 26 percent employment growth of dentists. Since the average growth rate of dentists' employment is 2 percent, having a law that allows hygienists to have an independent business would reduce their growth rate to about 1.5 percent. Since hygienists and dentists are
2006 from the ADA. Their correlation was .92 and .96, respectively. This suggests that the OES is an appropriate measure of dentists' and hygienists' employment by state and year.
often substitutes for each other's services in the production of dental services, the state provisions favoring hygienists may reduce the need for dentists in the state.
In order to test for the robustness and sensitivity of our results, we show two cases in Table 8 ( Leamer, 2010).
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In panel A we estimated the role of the DHPPI on the earnings of dental assistants who are not universally licensed and have different requirements than dental hygienists, and found no influence of the index to include market structure on their earnings in the ACS. In panel B, we performed another robustness check using data from the ACS for registered nurses, who have another set of statutes influencing the market structure for their occupation. We found that the DHPPI had no influence on the earnings of registered nurses.
These results suggest that our results did not result from other factors that were not captured by the state fixed effects.
Since our results show elements of monopsony as shown in our theory and evidence, there are also potential redistribution effects and economic losses within the context of both occupations being licensed. If there is no reduction in the quality of services provided to patients with fewer regulations in dentistry, then an application of a deadweight loss analysis can give the parameters to estimate potential losses to society from monopsony in the market (Kleiner and Kudrle, 2000) . Using the parameters developed from the results from theory and our estimates, we show in Table 9 that the reallocation from hygienists to dentists is approximately $1.34 billion per year. The output loss due to the monopsonistic restriction of employment is approximately $0.08 billion per year. The output loss due to licensing is between $0.54 and $0.68 billion per year. Therefore, the total losses associated with overall occupational licensing 15 Further, Appendix D shows estimates using the lag of the self-employment policy variable for hourly earnings and employment growth. These results are consistent with those in Tables 3 through 6 . We also performed additional robustness tests excluding self-employed dentists. The qualitative influence was robust. Specific sample selection procedures for dental assistants and registered nurses and full results are shown in Table 7 and Appendix D and within-occupation regulation are between $0.62 and $0.75 billion annually. This results in approximately a 1 percent annual reduction in the output of dental services for those states that required dentists' supervision of dental hygienists using a basic deadweight loss analysis (Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil, 2009 ).
Conclusions
The licensing of occupations is most pervasive among health care occupations. Our study examines two occupations-dentists and dental hygienists-that are universally licensed in all fifty states in the United States. We initially explore the evolution of licensing for these two occupations, and the legal conditions governing permissible tasks for hygienists that impact both occupations. We show the conflict that has arisen over the allocation of work and supervision of tasks. Next we show the anatomy and timing of the implementation of regulations by state that guides the work that each of the occupations can legally do by state statutes and administrative decisions. Given this institutional background, we extend a model of dental production that has elements of occupational licensing that favors dentists in the production of services to patients.
The model shows that regulations requiring dentists to supervise hygienists result in higher earnings for dentists and lower earnings and employment for dental hygienists. We then extend the model to show that it has elements of monopsony, which can result in potential deadweight losses to society if licensing and these monopsony rents are pervasive.
The estimates from the empirical models show the impact of regulations that favor tasks that hygienists can perform on the wages and employment of dentists and hygienists for the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . During this time period, hygienists were allowed to do more tasks and in seven states were allowed to work without the supervision of a dentist. The time and state fixed effects models for both dentists and hygienists showed that greater autonomy by legally allowing hygienists to work independently of dentists is associated with an approximately 10 percent higher wage and a 6 percent increase in the employment growth of dental hygienists. In contrast, these state provisions are associated with approximately a 16 percent reduction in dental hourly earnings and a 26 percent reduction in dental employment growth in the states. In part, this larger loss by dentists is as a result of a change in the service and product mix that is delivered by hygienists in comparison to full-service dental offices. Using a simple deadweight loss analysis consistent with a monopsony model, we find that the typical state would lose approximately 1 percent of dental expenditures due to licensing, and by not allowing hygienists to practice on their own.
Overall, the results suggest that state laws on permissible tasks matter in wage and employment determination for both dentists and hygienists. With occupational licensing, the final arbiter of who gets to do work is the responsibility of the state legislature and the courts.
The decisions by these policy makers appear to influence wage and employment outcomes for practitioners in the occupations. Additional potential conflicts for licensed occupations such as architects and interior designers arising from the issue of who can legally do certain tasks also can be examined in this manner. Further, more data and analysis on the impact of who gets to do the work on patient outcomes would further assist policy makers on whether allowing hygienists greater autonomy in dental services would have a net benefit to the public. Along with the analysis in this study, such data would add more to the evaluation of licensing laws in health care and the battles between licensed occupations for enhanced work and pay.
https://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/02_NationalHealthAccountsHistorical. . By contrast, a competitive labor market would reach equilibrium at point C, where supply S* equals demand. This would lead to employment L* and wage w*. Triangle AML is deadweight loss, the part that has been lost by society as a result of the monopsonistic restriction of employment; and rectangle w L w M MM' is the part that the monopsonist licensed employer has exploited from the other licensed workers. Triangle LL"C is deadweight loss, the part of the competitive social surplus that has been lost by society due to the licensing of workers. 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007) Note: The estimation procedure is described in footnote 13. (Schwieters and Harper, 2007) .  Dental hygienists account for approximately 23.2 percent of the total labor costs (from the ratio of the average hourly earnings of dentists and hygienists in Table 3 ).  Therefore, labor costs for hygienists are approximately $13.40 billion (=$96.36 billion × 0.60 × 0.232), which is rectangle w Figure 2 . Tables 4 and 6 ). -Then, we are able to compute the reallocation from hygienists to dentists (rectangle
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.100 × $13.40 billion = $1.34 billion -Although we cannot compute a deadweight loss due to the restrictions (i.e., triangle AML as a whole), we can approximate it with triangle M'ML by multiplying two. Then, the deadweight loss due to the monopsonistic employment restriction is 
.40 billion = $0.82 billion. -Then, hygienists' total revenue is $15.64 billion (=$13.40 billion + $1.34 billion +$0.08 billion +$0.82 billion). -Given that the licensing premium is 15 percent economy-wide (Kleiner and Krueger, forthcoming), then the reallocation from consumers to hygienists' services is $2.35 billion (=0.15*$15.64 billion). -Also, given that the mean value of demand elasticity of labor is 0.3 (Hamermesh, 1993) , the deadweight loss due to licensing (i.e., triangle LL"C in Figure 2 ) should be about $0.70 billion. If only 80 percent is deadweight (Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil, 2009) , then $0.56 billion.
 The total output losses would be $0.56 billion to $0.70 billion due to licensing plus the monopsony effect of $0.08 billion, which equals $0.64 billion to $0.78 billion. Independence from Dentists (Rasch)
A Rasch scale of independence from dentists that is used to form the summated measure of Independence from Dentists.
Self-Employment Allowed
We coded 1 when the provision allows hygienist to be self-employed other than as independent contractor; otherwise 0. To generate our sample of dentists and dental hygienists, we started by dropping individuals who belong to the categories "Working without pay in family business or farm" and "Unemployed." Thus, our sample includes individuals who belong to the classes of (1) Private wage and salary workers, (2) Government workers (who work in any local, state, or federal governmental unit), and (3) Self-employed both in own not incorporated business and in own incorporated business.
Next, we dropped individuals whose education is "Below Associate" for dentists and individuals whose education is "Below 12 th Grade without Diploma" for dental hygienists. We also dropped individuals whose age is greater than 65 and whose years of experience (=Age −years of schooling -6) is below zero and individuals whose usual working hours in the past 12 months are less than 20 hours or more than 60 hours.
To compute the hourly earnings, we first computed annual hours worked (i.e., the usual working hours times the number of weeks for the past 12 months). Then we compute annual earnings by adding the wage and salary income (i.e., wagp) and the income from selfemployment (i.e., semp), and then divide the annual earnings by annual hours worked.
In computing the hourly earnings, however, the ACS has two potential measurement problems: the presence of outliers and the topcoding (or censoring) of both incomes (i.e., wagp and semp), particularly for dentists. First, a few individuals report implausibly high earnings relative to their hours of work, which would affect the estimated mean and variance of hourly earnings. We deleted observations whose hourly earnings were in the top 0.5 percent for each occupation. As a result, the highest hourly earnings were in the range of two times of the top coded hourly earnings. We computed the top coded hourly earnings (also top coded hourly wagp and semp) assuming that the top coded individuals worked for 40 hours and 52 weeks in a given year. For individuals who had wagp (semp) only, we assigned the top coded hourly wagp (semp)
as their hourly earnings. For individuals who had both wagp and semp and the sum of hourly wagp and hourly semp was greater than the higher of the top coded hourly wagp and the top coded hourly semp, we assigned the higher of the top coded hourly wagp and the topcoded hourly semp as their hourly earnings.
To deal with the topcodings, as much of the literature does, we adjusted the topcoded incomes by a factor (typically, 1.33 or 1.4) that approximates the mean for those above the censoring point (Card and DiNardo, 2002) . In this paper, we present empirical results using hourly earnings adjusted by a factor of 1.4.
For individuals who reported implausibly low earnings, we deleted these observations with measured hourly wages below the federal minimum wage of $ 
